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I analyze two extensions to the standard model of life cycle labor supply that feature operative choices
along both the intensive and extensive margin. The first assumes that individuals face different continuous
wage-hours schedules. The second assumes that all work must be coordinated across individuals. These
models look similar qualitatively but have very different implications for how aggregate labor supply
responds to changes in taxes. In the first model, curvature in the utility from leisure function plays
relatively little role in determining the overall change in hours worked, whereas in the second model
it is of first order importance. The second model has important implications for what data is best able
to provide evidence on the extent of curvature in the utility from leisure function.
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richard.rogerson@asu.edu1. Background and Introduction
Starting with the contribution of Lucas and Rapping (1969) and continuing with
the development of modern business cycle theory by Kydland and Prescott (1982),
economists have sought to understand aggregate labor market outcomes using a
framework in which individual economic agents solve explicit optimization prob-
lems and interact through explicitly speciﬁed market structures. An early con-
troversy in this literature concerned the relationship between individual and ag-
gregate labor supply elasticities. Speciﬁcally, in the early representative agent
models that dominated the literature and featured solely an intensive margin of
labor supply, an exercise of the sort pioneered by MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji
(1986) would uncover the value of the key preference parameter that completely
characterized both individual and aggregate labor supply responses. This raised
an immediate problem, since the implied elasticities from micro data were much
smaller than the implied elasticities from aggregate data. Some concluded that
this inconsistency was evidence against the overall approach to aggregate eco-
nomics emphasized by this research program. Heckman (1984) oﬀered a diﬀerent
assessment in his discussion of Kydland (1984) and Ashenfelter (1984). He sug-
gested that the key underlying issue was that the models being used both in
micro and aggregate studies were abstracting from key features of individual la-
bor supply problems, thereby limiting the usefulness of comparisons across these
studies. Speciﬁcally, he argued that because adjustment at the extensive margin
is so prevalent at the individual level, any compelling analysis that seeks to derive
aggregate implications from individual choice problems would have to incorporate
1an extensive margin into the analysis.1 Absent such a model, it was not clear what
the implications would be for aggregate labor supply, nor what the signiﬁcance of
the MaCurdy style estimates for prime aged males would be.
One interpretation of the comments in Heckman (1984) is that they issued
a call to develop models which simultaneously capture the important margins of
individual labor supply, allow for a rich structure of heterogeneity, and permit
us to solve for aggregate outcomes. This would allow us to connect analysis of
both individual and aggregate data in a consistent framework. A simple reality
of economic analysis is that the quantitative implications of any particular model
typically depend on the various features and parameter values that characterize
the individual decision problems. Some features that are “realistic” may turn out
to not be quantitatively important in terms of substantive economic implications.
One of the key objective of economic research is to sort out the important from
the not-so-important features in the context of speciﬁc issues of interest. To carry
out this type of analysis in a consistent fashion requires exactly the sort of model
just described.
Shortly after Heckman’s (1984) comments, macroeconomists found a way to
tractably introduce an extensive margin of labor supply into their models. Hansen
(1985) introduced the indivisible labor assumption of Rogerson (1988) into an oth-
erwise standard aggregate model. While in principle this could have facilitated
a greater connection between these models and the micro data on labor supply,
the immediate eﬀect was almost the opposite. A key property of these represen-
1Heckman (1993) also emphasized the importance of heterogeneity and the extensive margin
in connecting individual labor supply with aggregate labor supply.
2tative household models was that the aggregate labor supply elasticity was large
independently of the value of the elasticity parameter estimated by MaCurdy and
others. As a result, many macroeconomists viewed the indivisible labor assump-
tion as a justiﬁcation to not look at the micro data on labor supply, since one
prominent component of this literature was focused on a parameter which was no
longer relevant. Browning et al (1999) pointed out this disconnect from the micro
data. In particular, they suggested that while the equilibrium allocations studied
by Hansen (1985) and others represented a signiﬁcant improvement over the ear-
lier analyses because of the presence of adjustment along the extensive margin,
the individual employment histories in these models did not correspond at all to
those found in the data.2
The last ten years has witnessed important extensions of the basic indivisible
labor model, and puts us in a position to better address both micro level ob-
servations and implications for aggregates within a single model. Of particular
interest is the work by Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) and An et al (2009). These
authors study models that feature idiosyncratic shocks, incomplete markets and
indivisible labor choice.3 In the context of this model, one can carry out the
same type of individual level estimation exercise that MaCurdy (1981) and others
p e r f o r m e d ,a tt h es a m et i m et h a to n ec a ne x a m i n et h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fa g g r e g a t e
2Browning et al (1998) claimed that the Hansen (1985) model implied equal employment
probabilities next period for both the current employed and non-employed. In fact, the structure
of the transitions is actually indeterminate. While this implies that the data are not inconsistent
with the model, the model certainly does not help us understand why we see particular patterns
in terms of movements between employment and non-employment.
3These models follow the important earlier contributions of Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994)
and Krusell and Smith (1998).
3shocks for aggregate hours of work in the spirit of Kydland and Prescott (1982).4
In the context of these models, the old micro data estimates do not turn out to
be of great importance in informing us about the size of aggregate ﬂuctuations,
while at the same time aggregate labor supply is somewhat less elastic than in
the earlier representative agent models. More recently, Krusell et al (2010, 2011)
add trading frictions to this framework and show that it can also account for the
ﬂows of individual workers between the employment, unemployment and out of
the labor force states. French (2005) and Low et al (2010) show in partial equi-
librium settings that a model of this sort is also consistent with many features of
life cycle labor supply.
In summary, much has changed over the last twenty-ﬁve or so years. Viewed
from the perspective of the current models that economists are using, the ini-
tial controversy about individual and aggregate labor supply elasticities based on
importing the estimates of MaCurdy into aggregate representative agent models
seems somewhat archaic. We can now explore which model features are important
in accounting for various aspects of micro level data and assess the importance of
these features for various issues that involve aggregate outcomes. While we now
have a solid foundation, there are still many open questions, dealing with such
issues as the importance of various types of shocks, the nature of human capi-
tal accumulation, the importance of diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity, the role of
4An et al (2009) also revisits the contribution of Mankiw et al (1985) and shows that if one
tries to interpret the aggregate data in this model as coming from a representative household
that only adjusts labor along the intensive margin, one obtains the same types of problematic
results that these authors ﬁnd, i.e., parameter estimates of the wrong sign and violation of
concavity.
4market structure, trading frictions, family structure, etc....
A key point to take away from this brief overview of developments over the
last twenty-ﬁv eo rs oy e a r si st h a tc h o i c ea l o n gt h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i nﬁgures promi-
nently in current thinking about individual and aggregate labor supply. In many
existing models the extensive margin is introduced by assumption—in any given
period the individual is assumed to have only two choices—work some pre-speciﬁed
number of hours, or work zero hours. At a descriptive level, this assumption seems
empirically reasonable, corresponding to the observation that there is a great deal
of concentration in the distribution of work hours, at the weekly or even annual
level. But while the assumption of indivisible labor is empirically descriptive,
given its prominence in these models one might well ask what deeper forces lead
to this concentration of working hours, and whether the aggregate properties of
the model depend on the underlying cause of this concentration. In this paper I
take a ﬁrst look at this issue. In particular, I consider two diﬀerent extensions
of a standard life cycle labor supply model that involve explicit choice along the
intensive and extensive margins, each of which represents ideas that have been
explored quite a bit in the labor supply literature. In the canonical labor supply
model, an individual can work any number of hours, and the wage per unit of
time is ﬁxed, leading to a linear budget equation. Researchers have argued that
several factors are likely to inﬂuence the nature of the constraint set that individ-
uals face when making labor supply decisions, and the two models that I consider
incorporate some of these factors.
The ﬁrst model that I consider assumes that workers face a (continuous) menu
5of hours and wage options, with the property that the wage per unit of time is
increasing in the volume of work performed. Examples of papers that have doc-
umented the presence of non-linear hours-wage menus include Moﬃtt (1984), Al-
tonji and Paxson (1988), Biddle and Zarkin (1989), Dickens and Lundberg (1993),
Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Aaronson and French (2004).5 My analysis of this
model largely summarizes recent work by Prescott et al (2009) and Rogerson and
Wallenius (2007, 2009). A key feature of this ﬁrst model is that workers are still
free to choose their hours of work in any given period, although the budget set is
no longer linear.
The second model assumes that the work schedule (i.e., intensive margin) is
a collective choice in the economy, and that once the work schedule is chosen,
the only choice that an individual worker faces is whether to work this ﬁxed
number of hours at the going wage rate. This assumption is meant to capture the
desire for coordination. The motives for coordination may come from the need for
workers within and across ﬁrms to work together, or for individuals to coordinate
leisure time and/or family schedules. I do not model the underlying reason for
coordination, and in a well deﬁned sense focus only the best outcome given the
need to coordinate. A key feature of this model is that given a particular collective
choice for the work schedule, a worker is not free to work any number of hours, and
so it is typically the case that the hours of work for an individual are not consistent
with the hours that he or she would choose to work in that period if they faced
5While these papers assume that the non-linearity shows up in earnings, one could more
generally assume that workers face ﬁxed costs outside of the workplace, such as commuting
costs. In this regard, the early work of Cogan (1981) on ﬁxed costs is also very relevant.
6al i n e a rb u d g e te q u a t i o ng i v e nt h ew a g er ate. A large literature documents that
desired and actual hours of work typically diverge. See, for example, Kahn and
Lang (1991), Bell and Freeman (2001) and Sousa-Poza and Henneberg (2003).
From the perspective of the individual worker, one can think of this model as
one in which the worker faces a discontinuous menu of wage and hours choices,
with wages equal to zero for any hours choice other than the collectively decided
value. But a key point is that the location of the discontinuity is determined by
the collective choice rather than being a feature of technology.
Consistent with the data, both of these extensions to the standard life cycle
model generate life cycle proﬁles for hours at the individual level in which adjust-
ment at the extensive margin plays a key role. I provide analytic and graphical
characterizations of optimal lifetime labor supply along the intensive and extensive
margins for both models.
I then consider how aggregate labor supply in the two models responds to an
increase in the scale of a simple tax and transfer program, and in particular, I
contrast them with the outcome that emerges in the standard life cycle model
with only an intensive margin of adjustment. The striking ﬁnding is that the
two models with operative extensive margins for life cycle labor supply generate
dramatically diﬀerent aggregate outcomes. In the standard model in which the
only relevant margin is the intensive margin, the aggregate response is tightly
connected to the preference parameter that dictates curvature in the utility from
leisure. Whether the response is large or small depends critically on this parame-
ter. Consistent with the results of Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), the model with
7a continuous hours/wage menu generates relatively large responses independently
of the preference parameter that dictates curvature in the utility from leisure. In
sharp contrast, the results in the work schedule model closely mirror those in the
standard model. The important result that follows is that the mere presence of
an important role for the extensive margin in terms of life cycle labor supply does
not necessarily generate large aggregate elasticities.
While the work schedule model has very diﬀerent implications for what factors
shape the response of aggregate hours to a change in tax and transfer programs,
it also has important implications for empirical work that aims to uncover these
factors, in particular the curvature parameter in the utility from leisure function.
Speciﬁcally, this model implies that individual labor supply responds diﬀerently
to idiosyncratic variation in driving forces than it does to aggregate variation in
driving forces.6 If the work schedule is a collective choice, then it will be invariant
to purely idiosyncratic variation in the economic environment, but not to changes
in aggregate or common factors. The implication in the stark model studied in
this paper is that analysis of micro data may not be suﬃcient in estimating this
key preference parameter. In particular, aggregate data may have a signiﬁcant
role to play in determining the value of this parameter.7
An outline of the paper follows. Section 2 describes the three models and
characterizes their implications for life cycle labor supply. Section 3 considers the
6This point is also made by Chetty et al (2011). In their model, the coordination problem
only exists within a given ﬁrm, but aggregate conditions inﬂuence the hours choice made by
each ﬁrm and create more bunching in hours that would otherwise be observed.
7This issue has been recognized in the literature. See for example, Ham (1982), Biddle (1988)
and Khan and Lang (1991). See also the discussion in Fehr and Goette (2007) regarding the
desirability of experimental data.
8implications of each model for changes in the scale of a simple tax and transfer
program, both qualitatively and in some simple numerical examples. Section 4
discusses the results of the analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2. Three Models of Life Cycle Labor Supply
In this section I describe three diﬀerent models of life cycle labor supply. The ﬁrst
model is the canonical model of life cycle labor supply in which the individual
can work any number of hours and faces a period budget equation that is linear
in hours worked. As we will see below, this model can generate a corner solution
for hours worked in which hours worked are zero at some ages. The key property
from our perspective is that hours worked are a continuous function of underlying
state variables, so there is never a discrete jump from positive hours to zero
hours assuming that life cycle productivity varies continuously. The other two
models both feature the possibility that hours will jump discontinuously from a
positive amount to zero even if underlying productivity is changing continuously.
Following Prescott et al (2009), one of these will assume a nonconvex mapping
from time devoted to work to labor services. As noted in the introduction, this
assumption implies that workers face a menu of wage/hours combinations when
making labor supply choices. The other model will constitute the analysis that is
novel to this paper, and assumes that an individual is forced to choose a ﬁxed work
length for all dates at which labor supply is positive. This is meant to capture the
notion that due to coordination issues, all production must be carried out with a
ﬁxed working schedule. If this work schedule were exogenously given, this would
9amount to the standard indivisible labor model of Rogerson and Hansen. But
the novel feature here is that the work schedule is chosen by the worker at the
beginning of life.
2.1. The Standard Life Cycle Model
Because the extensions that I consider next will have implications for the fraction
of lifetime that an individual spends in employment, it is convenient to formu-
late the model in continuous time, implying that the labor supply choice along
the extensive margin is a continuous choice variable and thereby allowing one to
characterize optimal choices using standard methods. Consider an individual with
length of life normalized to one with preferences deﬁned by:
Z 1
0
[u(c(a)) + v(1 − h(a))]da
where c(a) is consumption at age a, h(a) is time devoted to market work at age
a, u(·) gives the utility ﬂow from consumption and v(·) gives the utility ﬂow from
leisure. We assume that these two function are twice continuously diﬀerentiable,







0(1 − h)=+ ∞
I assume that utility is separable between consumption and leisure. While this
has counterfactual implications for the behavior of consumption over the life cycle
10in the analysis that follows, it serves to simplify the analytic presentation of the
results and so is convenient for purposes of exposition. I have also chosen to assume
that the individual does not discount future utility ﬂows. As will become clear
shortly, this also serves to simplify the analytic characterization of the solution to
the individual’s maximization problem. I will focus on the case where the interest
rate is also zero, so that these two factors will be oﬀsetting as is standard in many
aggregate models with inﬁnitely lived agents.
Following much of the life cycle labor supply literature, I assume that the
productivity of an individual’s time varies systematically over the life cycle. In
particular, if an individual of age a devotes h units of time to market production,
I assume that this yields ˜ e(a)h units of labor services. In the numerical work that
follows I will assume that the age proﬁle for this productivity process follows the
shape shown in Figure 1.
A few remarks are in order regarding the assumed shape of this productivity
proﬁle. First, for reasons of analytic tractability, I am assuming that this produc-
tivity process is exogenous, and so in particular, I am abstracting from human
capital accumulation decisions that may lie behind this proﬁle. In the data, wages
a r en o ts y m m e t r i co v e rt h el i f ec y c l e ,i nt h es e n s et h a tw a g e sa tt h ee n do ft h el i f e
cycle are much higher than wages at the beginning of the life cycle. If one takes
wages as exogenous and assumes complete markets for borrowing and lending,
this can create a problem for a model that includes an endogenous retirement
decision. The reason for this is that there is an incentive for individuals to avoid
working in the early part of life in order to avoid the low wages during the period,

























Figure 1: Productivity Over the Life Cycle
and to instead work more at the later part of the life cycle when wages are higher.
Wallenius (2009) develops a life cycle labor supply model with an operative ex-
tensive margin and human capital accumulation, and shows how it can match the
life cycle proﬁle for both wages and hours.8 To maintain tractability, rather than
include a human capital accumulation decision, I choose to abstract from trying
to match the actual proﬁle of wages over the life cycle.
Alternatively, one can assume that productivity is constant over the life cy-
cle, but that the utility from leisure varies systematically over the life cycle. In
8Ljungqvist and Sargent (2010) also develop a tractable model of life cycle labor supply in the
presence of human capital accumulation assuming an exogenously given restriction of indivisible
labor.




























Figure 2: Value of Leisure Over the Life Cycle
particular, assume that preferences are given by:
Z 1
0
[log(c(a)+˜ α(a)v(1 − h(a))]da
where ˜ α(e) has the shape given by Figure 2 below:
The key issue from a modelling perspective is to have something in the model
that gives rise to a systematic change in the static net return to working over the
life cycle. In what follows I will only consider the speciﬁcation shown in Figure 1.
The wage rate per unit of labor services is assumed to be constant and equal to
w. The individual faces complete markets for borrowing and lending, so assuming
as noted above that the interest rate on borrowing and lending is equal to zero,







To this point I have only described a single agent decision problem. In the
subsequent analysis I will view this single agent problem in the context of a steady
state equilibrium in an overlapping generations model. At the risk of trivializing
the general equilibrium considerations, but with the gain of transparency, I will
assume that we are considering a small open economy in which the real interest
rate is exogenously ﬁxed at zero, and that there is an aggregate production func-
tion that is linear in labor services with marginal product equal to A.9 It follows
that if the price of output is normalized to one, the equilibrium wage rate w must
be equal to A. Assuming a new generation of identical individuals with total mass
equal to one is born at each instant, in steady state a new-born household will
solve the decision problem depicted above.
Characterizing the solution to the individual’s maximization problem is stan-













9The small open economy assumption is not essential. In this model one can always specify
ag o v e r n m e n td e b tp o l i c yt h a tw i l ls u p p o r tas t e a dy state equilibrium with a zero interest rate.
14c(a) ≥ 0,0 ≤ h(a) ≤ 1
The solution to this problem will entail a constant ﬂow of consumption, and hence










h(a)˜ e(a)da,0 ≤ h(a) ≤ 1
Substituting the budget equation into the objective function, we obtain the





0(1 − h(a)) (2.1)
which can also be written as:
v
0(1 − h(a)) = μw˜ e(a) (2.2)
where μ is the marginal utility of consumption.
There are two diﬀerent forms that the solution may take. One possibility is
that the entire proﬁle for h(a) is positive (other than possibly for a set of measure
zero, such as the two endpoints), as shown in Figure 3.
The other possibility is that the solution has zero hours of work for an interval
at the beginning and end of life, as shown in Figure 4.10
10In their analysis of female labor supply Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) generate corner














Figure 3: Interior Solution for Life Cycle Hours














Figure 4: Corner Solution for Life Cycle Hours






















Figure 5: Transformed Productivity Proﬁle
For reasons that will become clear subsequently, it is convenient to transform
the maximization problem via a simple change of variables. In particular, instead
of examining the optimal labor supply decision as a function of age, it will be
c o n v e n i e n tt or e o r d e rt i m es oa st oc r e a t eam o n o t o n ep r o ﬁle for productivity and
to instead focus on the mapping from productivity to hours without reference
to chronological time. I will use λ as the new index, and will denote the new
(monotone decreasing proﬁle) for productivity as e(λ).G i v e n˜ e(a) as in Figure 1,
the corresponding ﬁgure for e(λ) is shown in Figure 5.
Recasting the two diﬀerent solutions denoted above as functions of λ we get
Figures 6 and 7.
solutions in this manner, though they do not restrict attention to wage proﬁles of the shape that
Ic o n s i d e r .
















Figure 6: Interior Hours Solution With Transformed Productivity
















Figure 7: Corner Hours Solution with Transformed Productivity
18For future reference it is of interest to note that if we were to assume that e(λ)
were constant, the solution would be that h is constant.
2.2. A Nonconvex Mapping from Hours to Labor Services
Following Prescott et al (2009) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), this speciﬁ-
cation modiﬁes the worker’s problem by adding a feature to the mapping between
time devoted to work and labor services. In particular, we assume that this map-
ping features a nonconvexity. For simplicity, I focus on the special case in which
when a worker of age a devotes h units of time to market work, the resulting
supply of labor services is given by
max{h − ¯ h,0}˜ e(a)h
While one interpretation of ¯ h is that it represents commuting costs, Prescott et al
interpret it to reﬂect set-up costs on the job. From the perspective of equilibrium
allocations it does not matter which interpretation is adopted. But the interpre-
tation does matter for observed wages. Speciﬁcally, if ¯ h reﬂects set-up costs at
work, then the model delivers tied hours-wage bundles in equilibrium, whereas
with the pure commuting cost interpretation the wage per unit of time will be
independent of how many hours are worked.
Taking into account that the worker will choose a constant proﬁle for con-










max(h(λ) − ¯ h,0)e(λ)dλ,0 ≤ h(λ) ≤ 1
N o t et h a tt h eb u d g e te q u a t i o ni m p l i c i t l yt a k e si n t oa c c o u n tt h ef a c tt h a ta l t h o u g h
compensation per unit of labor services is constant and equal to w, compensation
per unit of time is non-linear in the number of hours devoted to market work. The
importance of this feature is that it creates a force for concentration of working
time as opposed to smoothing of working time. The analytics of this case are con-
tained in the somewhat more general analysis of Rogerson and Wallenius (2007),
but I sketch the details here for completeness. Once again it is convenient to work
in λ s p a c ei n s t e a do fa g es p a c e .F i r s tn o t et h a ti f¯ h is suﬃciently large, the key
qualitative result is that instead of having a continuous solution for h(λ),w eg e t
a solution that drops discontinuously to zero at some point, implying a solution
for h(λ) as depicted in Figure 8.11




0(1 − h(λ)) (2.3)
We know that h(0) will be positive since this corresponds to the highest productiv-
ity for the individual, and the marginal utility of consumption at zero consumption
is inﬁnite. Given a value for h(0), it follows from equation (2.3) that for any other
11See Rogerson and Wallenius (2010) for an analysis of how large ¯ h must be in order to
generate an interior solution along the extensive margin.
















Figure 8: Life Cycle Hours with Fixed Time Costs
value of λ with h(λ) > 0,t h ev a l u eo fh(λ) must satisfy:
v




0(1 − h(0)) (2.4)
Given a value for h(0) o n ec a ns o l v ef o rt h ee n t i r ep r o ﬁle for ˜ h(λ;h(0)) that solves
equation (2.4). Since e(λ) is decreasing, it follows trivially that ˜ h(λ,h(0)) is also
decreasing in λ.I ft h eo p t i m a lh(λ) proﬁle were interior at all values, we would be
done at this point except for the determination of h(0). If it is not interior for all
λ, the fact that productivity is decreasing in λ, implies that a simple reservation
property holds:
h(λ)=0for all λ ≥ λ
∗
21Given a value for h(0) and the solution for ˜ h(λ,h(0)) implied by equation (2.4),










max(˜ h(λ,h(0)) − ¯ h,0)e(λ)dλ
Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order condition for λ
∗ is:
w(˜ h(λ
∗,h(0)) − ¯ h)e(λ
∗)u
0(c)=v(1) − v(1 − ˜ h(λ
∗,h(0))) (2.5)
Combining this with equation (2.3) evaluated at λ =0gives:
v(1) − v(1 − ˜ h(λ
∗,h(0)))
(˜ h(λ






As shown in Rogerson and Wallenius (2007), equation (2.6) represents an upward
sloping relationship between h(0) and λ
∗ in the neighborhood of the optimal so-
lution. The economic intuition behind this relationship is that an optimal time
allocation must have the property that disutility per unit of income should be
equated along all margins. So just as equation (2.4) implies that an increase in
h(0) implies an increase in h(λ) for all λ,i ti sa l s ot r u et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nh(0)
implies that the individual should work deeper into the productivity distribution.
Given h(0) and the solution for ˜ h(λ,h(0)) from equation (2.4), we can represent





max(˜ h(λ,h(0)) − ¯ h,0)e(λ)dλ (2.7)
Since c is increasing in λ
∗ it follows that equation (2.7) represents a downward
sloping relation between h(0) and λ
∗. This downward sloping relation represents
the simple fact that in terms of generating consumption, the intensive and ex-
tensive choices are substitutes. That is, if an individual is working longer hours,
t h ev a l u eo fc o n s u m p t i o na tt h em a r g i nf r o mw o r k i n gm o r ea l o n gt h ee x t e n s i v e
margin is lower.
Assuming that the solution for λ
∗ is interior, the intersection of these two
curves is the solution to the life cycle labor supply problem for this individual.
For future reference, I note that if the productivity proﬁle were constant, then the
optimal solution would be that hours are constant and then drop discontinuously
to zero at some point. This highlights the sense in which this model has a force
that opposes the desire of the individual to have smooth hours of work.
2.3. Coordinated Working Times
In this section I add a diﬀerent constraint to the standard life-cycle problem. In
particular, in the spirit of the need to coordinate working schedules, I assume
t h a tt h ew o r k e rm u s tc h o o s eaﬁxed work schedule that applies to all periods in
which labor supply is positive. Once the work schedule is ﬁxed, the worker faces
a simple choice between working and not working at the ﬁxed schedule. In a
setting in which workers are heterogeneous, there is a nontrivial issue associated
23with how to determine the standard work schedule, since diﬀerent workers may
prefer diﬀerent values. Also, in a changing environment there is an issue about
how the work schedule may be altered. I am purposefully abstracting from these
potentially important issues in order to focus on some basic implications of this
feature that are present even in the absence of these other issues. A more extensive
discussion of these simpliﬁcations is postponed until later. The worker’s problem













c(λ) ≥ 0,0 ≤ h ≤ 1,I(λ) ∈ {0,1}
where in this problem h is the work schedule choice, and then I(λ) ∈ {0,1} is
an indicator function that represents the choice of whether to work given the
ﬁxed work schedule. As before, consumption will be constant over time, and as
in the previous subsection, the employment decision will be characterized by a
reservation rule: work when λ ≤ λ
∗. Of course, it is possible that the value of λ
∗
is equal to one, implying that the individual works in all periods.







∗v(1 − h)+( 1− λ
∗)v(1)
s.t.0 ≤ λ
∗ ≤ 1,0 ≤ h ≤ 1
24where h is the choice of work schedule that will hold throughout the individual’s
lifetime, and λ
∗ is the fraction of life spent in employment, which necessarily con-
sists of the fraction λ








Assuming interior solutions for both λ










∗)) = v(1) − v(1 − h) (2.10)
The ﬁrst equation depicts a downward sloping relationship between λ
∗ and h.T h e
second equation depicts an upward sloping relationship between λ
∗ and h.T h e
intuition behind these two relations is identical to that oﬀered in the previous
subsection. It follows that one can depict the solution to this problem as the
intersection of two curves, one of which is downward sloping and the other of
which is upward sloping.
2.4. Comparisons
To contrast the three diﬀerent solutions we begin by considering the extreme case
in which the productivity proﬁle is ﬂat. In the benchmark case this necessarily
leads to a ﬂat proﬁle for hours over the entire interval [0,1]. In the case of coor-
dinated working times the solution will be the same as in the benchmark model,
25since the coordinated working time problem is simply the benchmark problem with
some additional constraints. But since the optimal solution satisﬁes the additional
constraints, it follows that this solution must also be optimal in the presence of
the additional constraint. In the case of the nonconvexity in the provision of labor
services there are two separate cases to consider, depending on whether the non-
convexity is suﬃciently large to create an interior solution for the fraction of life
spent in employment. If this solution is not interior, then hours will necessarily
be constant. In this case the nonconvexity acts just like a reduction in the wage
rate. Depending upon the function u(·), this may shift the hours proﬁle up or
down relative to the other cases, but it will necessarily be constant. In the second
scenario, the result will be constant hours when working, but the individual will
only work for a fraction of his or her lifetime.
There are some interesting diﬀerences to note here. Although the ﬁxed work
schedule model looks in general like an indivisible labor model, in the absence
of any life-cycle heterogeneity it is identical to the model with perfectly divisible
labor. We will return to this later. In contrast, the model with the nonconvexity
in the supply of labor services can look like an indivisible labor model even in the
absence of life-cycle heterogeneity.
Now consider the models when the e(λ) proﬁle does change over time, i.e.,
in the presence of life-cycle heterogeneity. Assume also that the heterogeneity is
suﬃcient to generate interior solutions for employment in all three cases. Figure
9 shows hours proﬁles for the three cases, imposing that lifetime labor supply is
the same in all cases and that hours are positive for 70% of the individual’s life.12
12Note that for given preference and productivity parameters one would not expect the three





















Figure 9: Life Cycle Hours in Three Models
While all three models produce outcomes in which the individual works for
only a fraction of his or her life, a key distinction is that in the benchmark model
the hours proﬁle drops to zero continuously, while in the other two models the
hours proﬁle drops to zero discontinuously. This discontinuity in the life cycle
proﬁle for hours worked is a key distinguishing feature of the second and third
models relative to the benchmark model. Another interesting distinction has to
do with the proﬁle for hours worked while working. In the work schedules model,
the hours proﬁle is ﬂat for the region in which hours are positive, but in the other
two models there is a positive relationship between hours and productivity in the
region with positive hours. In this regard the ﬁrst two models are similar, while
the third is diﬀe r e n t . I nt e r m so fl i f ec y c l ev a r i a t i o n ,t h ew o r ks c h e d u l em o d e l
solutions to have these properties.
27looks like a pure indivisible labor model.
3. Tax and Transfer Programs
In this section I contrast the implications of the three models for how a simple
tax and transfer program aﬀects individual life cycle and aggregate labor supply
outcomes. In particular, I will consider a policy that levies a proportional tax τ on
labor income and uses the proceeds to fund a lump-sum transfer to all individuals
currently alive, subject to a balanced budget constraint. This simple policy has
been studied extensively in the literature on cross-country diﬀerences in hours of
work and serves as a useful benchmark for contrasting the implications of these
three models.13
3.1. Analytic Results
It is easy to derive the implications of such a tax policy on the optimal labor
supply choices of individuals. Given the speciﬁcation of the model we can interpret
the changes in the individual choices as reﬂecting changes in the steady state
equilibrium. In the case of the benchmark model, the ﬁrst order condition that






0(1 − h(0)) (3.1)
13This type of policy has been studied by Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2008), Ohanian et
al (2008), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), and McDaniel (2009). See Rogerson (2006) for a
presentation of diﬀerences in hours of work across countries.
28The condition that relates h(λ) to h(0) is unchanged, since the tax rate aﬀects











h(λ)e(λ)dλ = T (3.3)







0(1 − h(0)) (3.4)
Because the solution for h(λ) as a function of h(0) is unchanged, it follows that
the solution for h(0) is decreasing in τ.
Similar calculations can be done for the other two models. In both cases,
taxes do not distort the conditions that relate optimal choices along the intensive
and extensive margins. The reason is that both of these margins are distorted
by taxes in the same fashion, so that the distortions cancel. In terms of a di-
agrammatic exposition, this implies that the upward sloping curve that relates
optimal choices of intensive and extensive margins does not shift in response to
a change in the tax and transfer system. But the tax and transfer scheme does
distort the condition that relates total amount of time spent working to the mar-
ginal utility of consumption. This leads to a downward shift in the downward
sloping relation. It follows that in both cases an increase in the scale of the tax
29and transfer system leads to a decrease in hours worked along both the intensive
and extensive margins. It is important to note that although the two models have
similar qualitative predictions, this does not imply that the quantitative predic-
tions are similar. The reason for this is that the upward and downward sloping
relationships in the diagrammatic expositions are diﬀerent across the two models.
It is also instructive to contrast the implications of the three models for the
case in which there is no life cycle heterogeneity. In this case, it is easy to show
t h a tt h eb e n c h m a r km o d e la n dt h ew o r ks c h e d u l em o d e lw i l li m p l yt h a ta l la d -
justment takes place along the intensive margin, whereas the nonconvex labor
services model implies that all of the adjustment takes place along the extensive
margin.
3.2. Numerical Examples
In this subsection I solve some numerical examples to further explore the responses
studied analytically in the previous subsection. In order to do this one needs to
choose functional forms and parameter values. I choose the standard form for the








Ia l s oa s s u m et h a tu(c) is given by logc. This corresponds to the standard as-
sumption in most aggregate analyses, that preferences are consistent with balanced
growth. The appropriateness of this assumption in terms of matching individual
level trends in hours worked is somewhat of an open question. While this as-
30sumption is important for the level of the eﬀects that I report, it is not likely
to be of ﬁrst order importance in terms of the relative ﬁndings across the three
speciﬁcations.
For the life cycle productivity proﬁle I choose the quadratic speciﬁcation:
e(λ)=1− p0λ
2
Note that with log utility over consumption, the labor supply proﬁle is invariant to
proportional shifts in the productivity proﬁle, so that there is no loss in generality
in assuming e(0) = 1.
M ym a i no b j e c t i v eh e r ei st oe x a m i n et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h ev a l u eo fγ
and the resulting eﬀects of a change in taxes. As a result I will consider several
diﬀerent values of γ. Because the analysis of the work schedules model is the novel
contribution of this paper, I will focus on this model when choosing parameter
values. As noted earlier, the solution to this model will involve two values: the
fraction of time devoted to work when working, and the fraction of life spent in
employment. For each value of γ considered, I choose values of the two parameters
α and p0 so that the solution to this model gives h = .45 and λ
∗ = .74, implying
that aggregate hours worked, denoted by H,s a t i s f yH =1 /3.W h e n c h o o s i n g
these values I assume that τ = .30. This procedure would also fully parameterize
the benchmark model, since it has no additional parameters. However, I recali-
brate α for this model so as to ensure that aggregate hours of work also satisﬁes
H =1 /3. The non-convex model has one additional parameter ¯ h.F o rt h i sm o d e l
I ﬁx p0 at the level corresponding to γ =1 .00 i nt h ew o r ks c h e d u l em o d e la n dt h e n
31choose ¯ h and α so as to achieve the values λ
∗ = .74 and H =
R
h(λ)dλ =1 /3.
Table 1 shows the calibrated parameter values for the three models.
Table 1
Calibration of the Three Models
γ =0 .10 γ =0 .25 γ =0 .50 γ =1 .00
Benchmark Model
α. 0057 .2065 .6632 1.1814
p0 1.66 1.35 1.00 .65
Work Schedule Model
α. 0053 .1466 .4462 .8210
p0 1.66 1.35 1.00 .65
Non-Convex Model
α. 0297 .4584 .9947 1.5713
p0 .65 .65 .65 .65
¯ h. 37 .25 .13 .037
Af e wp a t t e r n se m e r g ei nT a b l e1 . T h ef a c tt h a tp0 is decreasing in γ is
intuitive. The smaller the value of γ, the more curvature there is in the utility from
leisure function, and the greater is the desire to have a smooth proﬁle for leisure. In
order for the individual to choose a path for hours with a given change in hours as
the worker moves between employment and nonemployment, one needs a greater
incentive in terms of productivity diﬀerences. That is, in order to encourage the
worker to go from h = .45 to h =0at λ = .7/ 4, a smaller value of γ requires a lower
32value of productivity at λ = .74. The required adjustment is very large. One way
to gauge this is to compute the implied range of wages during the working part of
the life cycle. The ratio of the lowest to the highest wage, i.e., e(λ
∗)/e(0) is .09,
.26, .45 and .64 as γ increases from .10 to 1.00. The corresponding ratio in the
data is about .50. One interpretation of this is that it is diﬃcult for this model
to reconcile low values of γ with observed hours and wage patterns over the life
cycle. A similar issue arises in the non-convex model. The greater the curvature in
the utility from leisure function, the greater the nonconvexity must be in order to
generate a solution in which the extensive margin is operative in the non-convex
model. As one can see from the table, for small values of γ, almost all of a worker’s
time is devoted to set-up costs. If one were to compute the implied penalty for
part-time work, associated with say h = .20 versus h = .40, then the penalty
would be 100% for γ = .10 or .25, and about 15% when γ =1 .00. Estimates in
the data suggest a penalty no greater than about 20%.14 Once again, it appears
diﬃcult to reconcile low values of γ with observations on hours and wages in this
model.15
I now consider the consequences of increasing τ to .50.T h i sd i ﬀerence in tax
and tax transfer programs approximates the scale of diﬀerences that one ﬁnds in
average eﬀective labor tax rates between the US and several countries in conti-
nental Europe, including Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.16 Table 2 presents
the results for the eﬀects of increases in the scale of the tax and transfer program
14See, for example, Moﬃtt (1984), Keane and Wolpin (2001), and Aaronson and French (2004).
15Rogerson and Wallenius (2010) pursue this issue in greater detail.
16See Mendoza et al (1994) and McDaniel (2006) for details concerning cross-country diﬀer-
ences in eﬀective tax rates on labor.
33in the benchmark model. In this table H and E represent aggregate hours and
the aggregate employment rate, respectively, while h(0) refers to hours worked at
peak productivity, and asterisks refer to these values in the τ = .30 equilibrium.
Table 2
Tax Eﬀects in the Benchmark Model
H/H∗ E/E∗ h(0)/h∗(0) Static H/H∗
γ =0 .10 .96 1.00 .96 .94
γ =0 .25 .90 .99 .93 .90
γ =0 .50 .85 .96 .89 .87
γ =1 .00 .79 .93 .87 .81
The ﬁrst column in this table shows the value of steady state aggregate hours
when τ = .50 r e l a t i v et ot h ec a s ew i t hτ = .30. Equivalently, this is the lifetime
labor supply for an individual when τ = .50 relative to the case where τ = .30.
The next two columns show the breakdown of this change in aggregate hours into
adjustment along the extensive and intensive margins. The last column shows
the implication for aggregate hours in a model that assumed a constant value of
productivity over the life cycle. With log utility, hours worked are independent
of the level of productivity, so one does not need to specify the actual level of
productivity as long as it is constant. In this case the employment rate is always
equal to one and there is no adjustment along the extensive margin. Since the
individual makes the same choice at each instant of time in this case, it turns out
that this speciﬁcation is equivalent to what one would obtain in a static labor
supply problem. The results in this table should not come as a surprise to anyone
34familiar with this type of exercise. There is a strong positive relationship between
the eﬀect of a tax/transfer on steady state hours and the value of γ.W h e n
γ =1 .00 the eﬀect of an increase in the labor tax rate of twenty percentage points
leads to an decrease in hours of work of roughly 20 percent. In contrast, when
γ = .10,t h ee ﬀect is only about one-ﬁfth as large. The last column shows that
the eﬀect of life cycle heterogeneity on this result is relatively small. One point of
interest in this table is that even in the context of this model, one can obtain a
response along both the intensive and extensive margins. As the second column
shows, when γ is large, there is a signiﬁcant change along the extensive margin.
But when γ is small, this response disappears.
Next we consider the case of the work schedule model. Results are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3
Tax Eﬀects in the Work Schedule Model
H/H∗ E/E∗ h(0)/h∗(0)
γ =0 .10 .96 1.00 .96
γ =0 .25 .90 .98 .92
γ =0 .50 .85 .95 .89
γ =1 .00 .79 .92 .86
For notational consistency I continue to label the adjustment along the in-
tensive margin by h(0)/h∗(0), though it should be noted that the hours proﬁle
is ﬂat in this model. The key result that emerges from this table is that both
the aggregate response and the breakdown of this response into intensive and
35extensive margins is virtually identical to that in the benchmark model. We post-
pone further discussion until we have presented results for the model with the
nonconvexity in the supply of labor services. Table 4 reports these results.
Table 4
Tax Eﬀects in the Non-Convex Labor Services Model
H/H∗ E/E∗ h(0)/h∗(0)
γ =0 .10 .84 .85 .98
γ =0 .25 .83 .85 .96
γ =0 .50 .81 .86 .93
γ =1 .00 .79 .88 .89
Because hours are not constant over the life cycle in this model, I report
the change along the intensive margin as the change in hours worked at peak
productivity. As noted in the analytic derivations, the hours proﬁle shifts down
proportionately, so this same drop is observed at all other points at which the
individual has positive hours. The results here eﬀectively mirror those presented
in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). First, and most important, the eﬀect of γ on
the aggregate response is relatively small.17 For values of γ that are below .50,t o
a ﬁrst approximation the eﬀect of an increase in τ from .30 to .50 is for aggregate
hours to decrease by about 17%. There is however, a large impact of γ on the
response of hours worked at peak productivity. As detailed in the third column,
17The eﬀect of γ on the aggregate response in hours is somewhat larger in this table than
in the corresponding results in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). The main reason for this is
they recalibrated the slope of the productivity proﬁle as γ changed in order to keep the relative
wage ratio constant over the lifecycle, taking into account the eﬀect of the nonconvexity on
compensation per unit of time.
36when γ =1 .00 the decrease is 11%, while when γ = .10 the response is only 2%.
This factor ﬁve diﬀerence is similar to what was found in the two previous models,
b u tw h a ti sd i ﬀe r e n ti nt h i sm o d e li st h a ta tt h es a m et i m et h a td e c r e a s i n gγ leads
to a decrease in the response along the intensive margin, it leads to an increase
in the response along the extensive margin.
4. Discussion
T h em a i nr e s u l tt h a tIw a n tt of o c u so ni st h ev e r yd r a m a t i cd i ﬀerence between
the work schedule model and the nonconvex labor services model. First and
foremost, the work schedule model implies that the aggregate response is very
sensitive to the value of the preference parameter γ, while the nonconvex labor
services model implies much less sensitivity. For the speciﬁcations considered, the
two models generate similar responses in aggregate hours when γ =1 , but when
γ = .10 the response in the nonconvex labor services model is roughly four times
as large. However, what is striking about these two diﬀerent cases is that if one
looks only at the life cycle proﬁles for the two cases, then one ﬁn d si nb o t hc a s e s
that in terms of life cycle labor supply almost all of the variation comes from
the extensive margin. In particular, consider the previous results for the case in
which γ = .10. In the case of the work schedules model, by assumption there is no
change along the intensive margin for an individual who remains in employment
over the life cycle. In the case of the nonconvex labor services model, the range
of work along the intensive margin for an individual over their life cycle is from
.433 to .457. So both of these models are consistent with the observation in the
37US data that annual hours of work vary relatively little for full time employed
males over the life cycle, with most of the variation in total hours for this group
due to changes from either full time to nonemployment, or full time to part time.
(See, e.g., Prescott et al (2009) for evidence on this point.) However, despite this
fact, the two models have dramatically diﬀerent implications for the magnitude
of the response in aggregate hours to a change in the scale of the tax and transfer
program.
Loosely speaking, one might view these two models as two diﬀerent models
that give rise to something that looks like a pure indivisible labor model, where
by a pure indivisible labor model I have in mind a model that takes the intensive
margin as ﬁxed exogenously. Such a model has two striking implications. First,
the aggregate labor supply response to changes in the scale of tax and transfer
programs is large, and second, the aggregate response in hours worked is indepen-
dent of the curvature parameter on the utility from leisure function. One might
conjecture that any underlying model that generates something that looks like
the pure indivisible labor model in steady state might have these same implica-
tions. The nonconvex labor services model analyzed by Prescott et al (2009) and
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) is one example for which this conjecture is true.
However, the very simple work schedule model analyzed in this paper shows
that this conjecture is not generally true. That is, the mere fact that the extensive
margin is the key margin of adjustment in terms of labor supply over the life cycle
need not imply that aggregate responses are large or that the preference parameter
dictating curvature in the utility from leisure function is irrelevant. In fact, despite
38the fact that the work schedules model implies that all adjustment over the life
cycle takes place along the extensive margin, we found that aggregate hours in
this model behaved virtually identical to how they behave in a model that has all
life cycle adjustment take place along the intensive margin. One simple conclusion
from the above discussion is that the implications of indivisible labor for aggregate
labor supply depend very much on what the underlying source of the apparent
indivisibility is.
This discussion cautions us that just because the extensive margin is domi-
nant in terms of individual labor supply changes over the life cycle, we should not
conclude that the curvature parameter in the utility from leisure function is irrel-
evant for understanding the response of aggregate hours to various changes in the
economic environment. But the work schedule model also has important implica-
tions regarding what information is needed to obtain estimates of the curvature
parameter γ. In particular, one might argue that micro data provides the best op-
portunity to learn about preference parameters because individuals are subjected
to many large idiosyncratic changes in the factors that shape their economic en-
vironment. Coupled with the fact that micro data sets give us observations on a
relatively large number of individuals, it follows that this source provides us with
lots of independent observations on how individuals respond to large changes in
their economic environment. But the simple model of work schedules that I have
sketched out implies that idiosyncratic variation is irrelevant to the determination
of the work schedules.18 That is, if we were to simply change the tax rate that a
18Chetty et al (2011) makes a similar point but more general point. In their model each ﬁrm
chooses its own work schedule, but takes into account the distribution of desired work hours
39given individual faces, as opposed to the tax rate that all individuals face, then
nothing would happen to the economy wide choice of work schedules and the in-
dividual decision problem would look just like a pure indivisible labor problem.
Even observing the entire lifetime labor supply response of a given individual to
a particular change in their economic situation would not allow us to uncover the
value of γ.
To pursue this a bit further, consider an individual who is near the point of
peak life cycle productivity, and consider how this individual responds to an unan-
ticipated change in the return to work at this point in time. If the unanticipated
change leads to higher returns to work, there is no option for the individual to
increase his or her hours of work, so we will necessarily not observe any change in
hours of work in response to this event. One might falsely conclude that individ-
uals are not very willing to substitute leisure, either across time or in return for
additional consumption. Alternatively, suppose that the eﬀect of the change is to
reduce the return to work. If the period being considered is close to peak produc-
tivity, then in order for the change to bring about a change in hours worked at
that point would require a suﬃciently large change in the return to work to lower
the return below that of the reservation productivity level e(λ
∗). It follows that
except for very large changes we would again observe no change for this individ-
ual. In either case, looking at contemporaneous responses at the individual level
to idiosyncratic changes in the return to working would lead us to ﬁnd eﬀectively
in the workforce. The implication is that tax changes which aﬀect only a small fraction of the
population are less likely to lead to changes in work schedules than are changes which aﬀect a
large fraction of the population.
40no response in hours worked. Yet the same change in the return to working, when
relevant for all individuals might lead to a large change in aggregate hours worked.
The key point is that despite the volume of changes that take place at the micro
level, it may be that the responses of individuals to aggregate changes in the eco-
nomic environment may play a key role in helping us uncover the key parameters
of individual preferences. Put somewhat diﬀerently, the results in Chang and Kim
(2006) show us that given a ﬁxed working length per period, micro data on hours
a n dw a g e sd on o tp r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o no nt h ep a r a m e t e rγ.
At this point it is useful to remark on some of the features of the very simple
work schedule model considered here. The work schedule model studied here is
really nothing more than an example that is (hopefully) useful in illustrating some
basic points. But as a serious model that might be used to provide compelling
guidance to either data analysis or the response of hours worked to policy changes
it undoubtedly raises some basic questions. First, taking as given that one of the
most robust patterns in the micro data is the increasing proﬁles for wages and an-
nual hours worked over the life cycle, an important limitation of the work schedule
model studied here is that it does not account for the increase in annual hours
worked over the life cycle. One generalization of the model considered here that
could address this issue would be to allow for the possibility that as individuals ac-
cumulate experience they perform diﬀerent roles within an organization, and that
some of these roles might require a diﬀerent number of hours. For example, when
an individual gets promoted from being a regular worker to being a supervisor, he
or she may have to show up for work earlier and stay later in order to facilitate the
41opening and closing of the establishment. The key point is that a work schedules
model may incorporate the reality that diﬀerent positions may be associated with
diﬀerent hours, with these diﬀerences reﬂecting considerations from the produc-
tion side. That is, even if wages and hours move together, the variation might be
determined solely by features of production, and so not provide any information
about preferences aside from the obvious revealed preference implication, that is,
that the individual is willing to work the additional hours associated with the
increase in pay and responsibility.
A second issues concerns the economy wide nature of the work schedule. While
one might accept the fact that a given establishment must choose a work sched-
ule that coordinates the working hours of its employees, it is somewhat less clear
that this needs to be done across establishments. One might then expect to see
diﬀerent establishments with diﬀerent work schedules, each one reﬂecting the de-
sired work hours for diﬀerent subsets of the population. In the simple model that
I studied, this might seem a reasonable solution to the problem. But there are
three issues to raise. First, it seems plausible that for many establishments, an
i m p o r t a n ta t t r i b u t ei si t sh o u r so fo p e r a t i o n ,a n dt h a ti ti si m p o r t a n tt ob ea v a i l -
able to deal with customers during what are perceived to be “usual” or “normal”
business hours. Second, to the extent that establishments care about turnover,
it is important to incorporate the potential productivity losses associated with
outcomes that would involve individuals moving across establishments whenever
there was a change in their desired hours of work. Third, to the extent that there
are some frictions in labor markets, establishments may need to take into account
42the work preferences of the “average” worker when creating a position.
Having raised these issues, it is of course also true that there are some diﬀer-
ences in work schedules across establishments within industries, as well as across
occupations or industries. Teachers have annual work schedules that are far dif-
ferent from many other occupations. It is plausible that this plays a role in the
decision of some individuals whether to enter a particular occupation. But it is
more likely that the selection relevant for this choice has to do with permanent
diﬀerences in preferences as opposed to life cycle changes in the return to working.
There are also many jobs in which coordination of work schedules is viewed as
less important. Many restaurants and retail establishments hire a mix of full and
part time workers. For certain subsets of the population these opportunities are
likely to be quite important and eﬀectively create a situation in which the worker
faces a ﬂexible hours choice at a given wage. Finally, even in a world in which
many jobs have ﬁxed work schedules, an individual can always augment his or
her hours of work by taking on an additional job from a sector that oﬀers oppor-
tunities with ﬂexible hours. The simple model that I considered assumed that
such possibilities do not exist. Understanding both the extent of the availability
of such opportunities and how they inﬂuence our inference about labor supply is
an important issue for future research.
5. Conclusion
Ia n a l y z et h r e ed i ﬀerent models of life cycle labor supply. The ﬁr s ti st h es t a n -
dard model in which hours of work change continuously in response to continuous
43changes in underlying primitive, such as productivity or preferences. The other
two both feature operative choices along both the intensive and extensive margin,
in the sense that hours of work can change discontinuously to zero in the face of
continuous changes in underlying primitives, but they diﬀer in terms of the under-
lying economic reason for the operative choice along the extensive margin. The
ﬁrst assumes that individuals face diﬀerent wage rates per unit of time depending
upon the amount of time devoted to work. The second assumes that all work
must be coordinated across individuals, implying that all individuals must work
the same amount of time. Qualitatively these two models look similar, in that
both can generate life cycle labor supply proﬁles in which adjustment along the ex-
tensive margin is the key margin of adjustment. However, these two models have
very diﬀerent implications for how aggregate labor supply responds to changes in
the scale of a simple tax and transfer scheme. In the ﬁrst model, curvature in the
utility from leisure function plays relatively little role in determining the overall
change in aggregate hours worked, whereas in the second case this parameter is
of ﬁrst order importance. It follows that an operative extensive margin need not
imply that this curvature is irrelevant for aggregate labor supply responses. How-
ever, I also argue that the second model has important implications for what data
is most able to provide evidence on the extent of curvature in the utility from
leisure function. In particular, panel micro data that is dominated by idiosyn-
cratic variation in the key forcing factors may not of much use. Instead, one may
want to ﬁnd forcing variables which feature aggregate variation.
The analysis presented here has focused on some very simple settings in order
44to best communicate the messages just repeated above. An important task for
future work is to examine the extent to which these messages are robust to set-
tings that are more closely connected to the data. The two models analyzed here
represent extensions of the canonical labor supply model in which the constraint
set facing the individual is altered. In the standard model, the one-period budget
constraint is linear in hours worked. In the model with a wage-hours menu, the
one period budget constraint is non-linear. In the work schedules model it is rep-
resented by two disjoint points. A basic message of the analysis is that the nature
of the constraint set matters both for inferring parameter values of individual
utility functions and for the aggregate response to a given change in the overall
economic environment. An important issue is to consider more general versions
of these features and to assess the quantitative signiﬁcance of each of them. For
example, even if hours at a particular employer are ﬁxed from the perspective
of an individual worker, there are other employers that may oﬀer diﬀerent hours
of work. Important issues then involve the extent to which this individual can
locate these other opportunities (i.e., are there search frictions) and the extent
to which the worker’s skills are transferable across employers (i.e., the nature of
human capital). Chetty et al (2011) is a recent paper that pushes in this direc-
tion. There may also be opportunities for working on a second job if the worker
wishes to increase his or her hours of work. One would then need to incorporate
t h ef o r mt h a tt h e s eo p p o r t u n i t i e st a k e .T h ee ﬀect of market imperfections, e.g.,
credit market imperfections, on constraint sets is also relevant, as is the nature
and extent of human capital accumulation. Finally, in the context of models with
45uncertainty, there are important issues about the nature of uncertainty and the
information sets of individual agents. While some work along these lines has been
carried out, there are still many issues to be resolved, speciﬁcally in assessing the
importance of these various features for the properties of aggregate labor supply.
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